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Premarket Notice Concerning Bioengineered Foods: A 
Proposed Regulation Satisfying Some of the Players, 
Some of the Time 
Christine Cochran* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) has proposed a 
regulation that would require developers of bioengineered foods to 
submit new products to a review of safety at least 120 days before 
their commercial distribution.1 A consulting process currently exists 
as a voluntary program, but the proposed regulation would make the 
process mandatory. Many developers of bioengineered foods are 
voluntary participants in this premarket consultation program, which, 
upon completion, provides the developer with a credential stating that 
it has met the “prevailing standard of care” for biotechnology 
products. In addition to the consulting process, however, the 
regulation mandates significant public disclosure of information 
regarding the procedures used to develop the product and any 
potential risks to consumer safety.  
This Note will consider the current regulatory climate for 
bioengineered food, as well as some of the policy views of groups 
that are likely to feel the impact of this regulation.2 Part II.A 
 
 * J.D. Candidate, 2003, Washington University School of Law.  
 1. Premarket Notice Concerning Bioengineered Foods, 66 Fed. Reg. 4706 (proposed Jan. 
18, 2001) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 192,592). 
 2. This Note will not consider the related issue of labeling of bioengineered food. For a 
discussion of this topic, see Ronald E. Bailey & Linda M. Bolduan, Genetically Modified 
Foods: Labeling Issues Are Driving the Regulators and Counsel, 68 DEF. COUNS. J. 308 
(2001); Alicia T. Simpson, Note, Buying and Eating in the Dark: Can the Food and Drug 
Administration Require Mandatory Labeling of Genetically Engineered Foods?, 19 TEMP. 
ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 225 (2001); Kelly A. Leggio, Comment, Limitations on the Consumer’s 
Right to Know: Settling the Debate Over Labeling of Genetically Modified Foods in the United 
States, 38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 893 (2001). A thorough discussion of the international 
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describes current United States regulatory requirements for 
bioengineered food. Part II.B describes the proposed regulation in 
detail, including its costs and benefits.3 Part II.C describes the 
perspectives of scholars who believe that more rigorous legislation is 
imperative. Part II.D describes the perspective of the biotechnology 
industry, which supports the view that product safety is best 
advanced when legislation and product stewardship coexist. Part II.E 
describes the perspective that further regulation is unnecessary and 
potentially harmful. Further, Part III details the benefits and 
drawbacks of each perspective, while Part IV submits that, with 
modification, the proposed regulation will fulfill its described 
purpose of “ensur[ing] that all market entry decisions by the industry 
are made consistently and in full compliance with the law.”4 
II. HISTORY 
A. Current Regulatory Requirements for Approval of Bioengineered 
Food Products 
The Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology 
(“Coordinated Framework” or “Framework”) regulates all 
 
implications of United States policy regarding bioengineered foods is also beyond the reach of 
this Note. For a synopsis, however, see infra note 80 and accompanying text. 
 3. See Mark Geistfeld, Reconciling Cost-Benefit Analysis with the Principle that Safety 
Matters More Than Money, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 114 (2001). Many people believe safety is more 
important than money, though they are reluctant to devote one-hundred percent of their money 
to eliminating safety risks. Id. at 116-17. State and federal governments must make legislative 
decisions based on cost-benefit analysis where required by statute. Id. at 120. A traditional cost-
benefit analysis “gives equal weight to economic and safety interests” and “often inequitably 
favors potential injurers at the expense of potential victims.” Id. Professor Geistfeld proposes a 
modified analysis, which accords additional weight to safety interests yet also considers 
monetary costs. He believes that one variable in determining an appropriate level of safety is 
whether an individual has voluntarily assumed a risk. Id. at 124. If an individual has not 
voluntarily submitted to a particular risk, the party in control of the risk bears a greater 
obligation to spend money to minimize the risk than if the individual had chosen to submit. Id. 
Modified cost-benefit analysis is most important in cases where the individual does not 
voluntarily submit to the risk. Id. Professor Geistfeld suggests a rule that “gives the relevant 
safety interests twice as much weight as ordinary economic interests [to] reduce risk below 
levels attainable by the conventional cost-benefit negligence standard and strict liability.” Id. at 
185. 
 4. Premarket Notice Concerning Bioengineered Foods, 66 Fed. Reg. 4706 (proposed Jan. 
18, 2001) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 192,592). 
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bioengineered foods in the United States.5 The Framework, 
promulgated in 1986, aligns existing legislation6 with the 
administrative procedures of the FDA, the United States Department 
of Agriculture (“USDA”), and the Environmental Protection Agency 
(“EPA”).7  
The USDA, the primary regulatory agency for non-bioengineered 
foods, governs the first step in approving bioengineered foods. A 
developer of a genetically modified crop that is intended for 
commercial distribution must first determine whether the crop 
qualifies as a “plant pest” under the Plant Protection Act.8 If so, 
before field-testing the product, the developer must secure a permit 
from the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (“APHIS”), a 
service that the USDA provides.9 Next, the developer must declare to 
 
 5. Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,302 (June 
26, 1986).  
 6. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1952). According to the holding in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, an 
individual may receive a patent on a live, genetically modified organism. 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
The Supreme Court held that the Patent Act of 1793 should apply broadly to include such 
products of “human ingenuity” even though it does not apply to discovery of natural 
phenomena. Id. at 309.  
 7. The Framework does not promulgate new laws regarding bioengineered food: “Upon 
examination of the existing laws available for the regulation of products developed by 
traditional genetic manipulation techniques[,] . . . for the most part, . . . [the current laws] 
address regulatory needs adequately.” Coordinated Framework for Regulation of 
Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. at 23,303. A key premise of the Framework is that bioengineered 
foods are merely “an extension of traditional manipulations that can produce similar or identical 
products [that] enable more precise genetic modifications, and therefore hold the promise for 
exciting innovation and new areas of commercial opportunity.” Id. at 23,302. The Framework 
strives for a full integration of the regulation of bioengineered products, and its two main 
objectives are to adopt “consistent definitions” and to use “scientific reviews of comparable 
rigor.” Id. at 23,303. Additionally, the Framework states that “[a]ny approach to implementing 
guidelines should not impede future developments in rDNA technology.” Id. at 23,308.  
 8. Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. at 23,304. See 
Plant Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 106-224, 114 Stat. 358, Title IV (2000). The Act defines 
“plant pests” as: 
[A]ny living stage of any of the following that can directly or indirectly injure, cause 
damage to, or cause disease in any plant or plant product: (a) A protozoan; (b) A 
nonhuman animal; (c) A parasitic plant; (d) A bacterium; (e) A fungus; (f) A virus or 
viroid; (g) An infectious agent or other pathogen; (h) Any article similar to or allied 
with (any of the above). 
Id. at § 7702(14). 
 9. Permits for the Introduction of a Regulated Article, 7 C.F.R. § 340.4 (2002). The 
APHIS permit procedure requires developers to disclose information about potential plant pests 
120 days before the proposed release. Developers must also conduct a large scale field test of 
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the FDA10 of any foods or food additives11 that are not “generally 
recognized as safe” (“GRAS”).12 The absence of such a declaration 
 
the product. Id. The APHIS may grant developers trade secret protection on their permit 
applications. Id. at 340.4 n.6. A permit application requires, inter alia, the following 
information: contact information for the person requesting the permit and the developers of the 
article; all names or designations of the article (“scientific, common, and trade names”); 
information regarding the molecular alterations to the article, including the process used to 
transform the article; geographic location where the article originated; description of the 
proposed experiment as well as the proposed safeguards against contamination and 
dissemination; description of the location of the test site; and description of proposed disposal 
procedures. 7 C.F.R. § 340.4(b). If APHIS refuses to grant a permit, the developer may appeal. 
If APHIS grants the permit, the developer is subject to several conditions that are intended to 
limit the dissemination of the plant pest. The developer must: take the appropriate steps to 
dispose of contaminated material that has contacted the article; keep the article isolated except 
as the permit allows; allow the APHIS inspectors to inspect the article and its relevant 
documentation; identify the article with a label; submit a field test report within six months of 
the experiment’s completion, which includes evidence of harmful effects on the environment; 
and notify APHIS immediately in the event of accidental release or significant unanticipated 
effects (including “excessive mortality or morbidity, or unanticipated effect on non-target 
organisms”). 7 C.F.R. § 340.4(b). 
 10. Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. 22,984 
(May 29, 1992). This policy states that Congress does not wish to relegate every food 
component to FDA review, due to the overwhelming burden it would create. Id. at 22,989. 
Where, for example, “the ingredient is a man made chemical having no widely recognized 
history of safe use in food,” the developer must submit a petition for FDA approval. Id. 
 11. A “food additive” is any chemical component intended for use in food, unless the 
substance is generally recognized as safe. Id. Further, 21 C.F.R. § 170.3(3)(1) (2002) defines a 
food additive as a substance, “the intended use of which results may reasonably be expected to 
result, directly or indirectly, either in their becoming a component of food or otherwise 
affecting the characteristics of food.” In addition, “A substance that does not become a 
component of food, but that is used, for example, in preparing an ingredient of the food to give 
a different flavor, texture, or other characteristic in the food, may be a food additive.” Id.  
 12. A product may reach GRAS status through one of two paths: (1) scientific review; or 
(2) if the substance was present in food before January 1, 1958, through “common use in food”. 
21 C.F.R. § 170.30(a) (2002). Developers generally demonstrate safety through “published 
studies which may be corroborated by unpublished studies and other data and information.” Id. 
For substances used in food before January 1, 1958, developers need not supply exhaustive 
scientific data. Rather, the FDA will rely on “generally available data and information.” Id. For 
substances that are similar to or derived from GRAS products (such as extracts or distillates of 
GRAS substances, or a substance that is synthetic but chemically identical to a GRAS 
substance), the FDA has a third procedure for reaching approval: “Affirmation.” 21 C.F.R. § 
170.35(b) (2002). To “Affirm” a product’s GRAS status, the FDA’s Commissioner places a 
sixty day notice of the substance on the Federal Register for public comment. The 
Commissioner considers any comments, and at the end of the sixty days, publishes a final 
finding in the Federal Register. Id. In Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, the District Court for 
the District of Columbia held that the FDA’s determination of GRAS status for rDNA foods 
was a statement of policy, and was therefore free from the reporting and assessment 
requirements of a “major federal action.” 116 F. Supp.2d 166, 174 (D.D.C. 2000). See infra 
notes 27-28 and accompanying text for an explanation of “rDNA”. 
 https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol12/iss1/9
p173 note Cochran book pages.doc  4/10/03 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2003]  Premarket Notice on Bioengineered Foods 177 
 
constitutes, by law, a representation that a product is GRAS.13 If the 
product is not GRAS, or was produced through techniques that are 
not GRAS,14 the FDA must review the product for safety before it 
may go on the market.15 If the altered trait provides protection against 
insects or other pests, the EPA reviews the product for safety.16 This 
review is conducted in addition to the FDA’s review of non-GRAS 
substances.17 
If a bioengineered food product does not contain any non-GRAS 
substances, and the product does not fit the EPA’s definition of a 
 
 13. Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. at 22, 
988, citing Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 402(a)(1) (1938).  
 14. The FDA explains that the genetic material transferred during genetic modification 
and the resulting expression products “would not ordinarily affect the GRAS status of the 
substances and, thus, would not ordinarily require regulation of the substance as a food 
additive.” Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. at 
22,990. As long as the expression products (substances produced by the transferred genetic 
material, such as fats, carbohydrates, or proteins) are “already present in generally comparable 
or greater levels in currently consumed foods,” the FDA finds no need for formal review. Id. On 
the other hand, if an expression product is significantly different from any substance currently 
found in food, such as “a novel protein sweetener,” the FDA would subject that substance to 
food additive review. Id.  
 15. Premarket review for food additives requires a “reasonable certainty” that no harm 
will result. Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. at 
22,988. See also 21 C.F.R. § 170.3(i) (2002): 
Safe or safety means that there is a reasonable certainty in the minds of competent 
scientists that the substance is not harmful under the intended conditions of use. It is 
impossible in the present state of scientific knowledge to establish with complete 
certainty the absolute harmlessness of the use of any substance . . . . In determining 
safety, the following factors shall be considered: (1) The probable consumption of the 
substance and of any substance formed in or on food because of its use; (2) The 
cumulative effect of the substance in the diet taking into account any chemically or 
pharmacologically related substance or substances in such diet; (3) Safety factors 
which, in the opinion of experts . . . are generally recognized as appropriate. 
 16. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (“FIFRA”), 7 U.S.C. § 136 
(2000). 
 17. Some scholars are critical of this regulatory process. See Neil D. Hamilton, Legal 
Issues Shaping Society’s Acceptance of Biotechnology and Genetically Modified Organisms, 6 
DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 81, 99 (2001): 
There are several results of this three-part regulatory approach. First, it creates the 
appearance of a detailed and comprehensive regulatory screen, so much so that 
promoters of biotechnology . . . can argue these are the most heavily regulated foods in 
history. Second, the reality may be somewhat less thorough . . . because the division of 
responsibility [means] it is not clear who is responsible for testing . . . the safety of 
people actually eating foods made from GMO products. 
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“plant-pesticide,” the developer has two options. The developer may 
place the product on the market immediately, or the developer may 
voluntarily consult with the FDA. In the latter case, the developer has 
an opportunity to receive a credential stating that it has met the 
“prevailing standard of care” for biotechnology products. This 
optional consulting process is the subject of the proposed 
regulation.18  
B. Proposed Regulation: Premarket Notice Concerning 
Bioengineered Foods.19 
The proposed regulation would make mandatory the premarket 
consulting process that is currently voluntarily followed by many 
biotechnology developers. It would also require that developers 
publicly disclose information regarding bioengineering methods, 
nutritional content, and potential for allergenicity. The FDA drafted 
this proposed regulation in response to public comment on a 1992 
policy statement on plant breeding.20  
The proposed regulation states that the FDA believes that the food 
industry has generally submitted new bioengineered foods to the 
FDA for approval through the voluntary consulting process,21 and 
that all bioengineered foods currently on the market have gone 
through this process.22 As of the proposed regulation’s publication, 
all developers that have placed a bioengineered food product on the 
market—except for one—have been large corporations or 
universities.23 Yet, the rule will also apply to both small companies 
 
 18. Premarket Notice Concerning Bioengineered Foods, 66 Fed. Reg. 4706 (proposed 
January 18, 2001) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 192,592). For a more detailed summary of 
these regulatory processes, see Stanley H. Abramson & J. Thomas Carrato, Crop 
Biotechnology: The Case for Product Stewardship, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 241, 244 (2001). 
 19. Rule Summary: “The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is proposing to require 
the submission to the agency of data and information regarding plant-derived bioengineered 
foods that would be consumed by humans or animals. FDA is proposing that this submission be 
made at least 120 days prior to the commercial distribution of such foods.” Id. at 4706. 
 20. Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. at 22,984. 
 21. Premarket Notice Concerning Bioengineered Foods, 66 Fed. Reg. at 4707-08.  
 22. Id. at 4708. 
 23. Id. at 4729. The FDA’s statistics cover “more than 45 biotechnology submissions,” 
submitted by eleven multimillion-dollar corporations, three universities, and one company that 
the FDA contends would meet the standards for a “small entity.” Id. 
 https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol12/iss1/9
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and international food developers who wish to introduce 
biotechnology foods in United States markets.24 
Key issues addressed in the proposed regulation include the 
methods used for modification of the biotechnology plant product,25 
and the methods for evaluating the safety and accuracy of the 
transformation.26 The rule is concerned only with plant 
transformation involving recombinant DNA (“rDNA”) techniques, 
because of the possibility of “unintended effects through 
mutations.”27 Unlike traditional plant breeding techniques, the FDA 
believes that rDNA technology may easily cause a disruption of 
functional genes and sequences in the target food plant. This 
disruption could result in consequences such as reduced expression of 
beneficial nutritional traits, or new or increased expression of harmful 
traits.28  
Nevertheless, the FDA also recognizes that rDNA techniques are 
more efficient than traditional breeding techniques because the rDNA 
techniques reduce the introduction of “extraneous genetic material,”29 
which traditional methods can prevent only through numerous 
generations of back-crossing.30 The FDA does not believe that the 
premarket regulation of products developed through traditional 
 
 24. Id. at 4712. According to the proposed regulation, the FDA “has tentatively concluded 
that . . . FDA must be notified of the intent to market [a bioengineered] food, including foods 
intended for import into the United States.” See also id. at 4729 (providing a description of the 
implications to small entities, as described in the Regulatory Flexibility Act. 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-
612 (1996)). 
 25. Premarket Notice Concerning Bioengineered Foods, 66 Fed. Reg. at 4709. 
“[S]ubstances may be introduced into food using [recombinant] DNA techniques that cannot be 
introduced by traditional breeding.” Traditional breeding techniques, as defined by the FDA, 
include hybridization of closely related plants that may be cross-fertilized (“narrow cross”), or 
of related plants that may not be cross-fertilized (“wide cross”). Id. at 4710.  
 26. Id. at 4708. The rule cites, for example, the creation of the FLAVR SAVER super™ 
tomato, where the developer employed molecular biology techniques to evaluate the safety of 
the product, including Northern, Southern, and Western blots. Id. 
 27. Id. at 4710. 
 28. Id. “[T]he introduced genetic segment may insert into a genetically active 
chromosomal location. Such insertion may disrupt or inactivate an important gene or a 
regulatory sequence that affects the expression of one or several genes, thereby potentially 
affecting adversely the safety of the food or raising other regulatory issues.”  
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. “Back-crossing” is a method for eliminating unfavorable traits that have been 
unintentionally introduced through hybridization of related plants. Breeders cross the 
hybridized plants with parent plants that do not exhibit the unfavorable characteristic. 
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breeding techniques is necessary,31 however, and further states that it 
would not subject all foods developed by rDNA techniques to 
premarket notification procedures.32 It would exempt three categories 
of rDNA biotechnology foods from premarket notification: (1) 
products of previously submitted transformation events;33 (2) 
products employing previously submitted uses of bioengineered 
food;34 and (3) products for which the FDA has already issued a letter 
of compliance—either under the mandatory process proposed in the 
rule, or under the current voluntary consulting process.35  
The proposed premarket approval process includes an optional 
pre-submission consultation with the FDA. This consultation is 
essentially identical to the current voluntary consultation process. 
The FDA also suggests that developers of bioengineered products 
that are intended for non-food uses, but could potentially enter the 
 
 31. Premarket Notice Concerning Bioengineered Foods, 66 Fed. Reg. at 4711, stating: 
The [FDA] has not found it necessary to assess routinely the safety of foods derived 
from [traditional] breeding methods, because over the last 50 to 60 years that some of 
these techniques have been used in plant breeding, breeders have used well established 
practices successfully to identify and eliminate, prior to commercial use, plants that 
exhibit unexpected adverse traits. 
 32. Id. “[M]any [rDNA] modifications will result in a food that does not contain an 
unapproved food additive, does not contain an unexpected allergen, and does not differ 
significantly in its composition compared with its traditional counterpart or otherwise require 
special labeling.” 
 33. Premarket Notice Concerning Bioengineered Foods, 66 Fed. Reg. at 4713. The 
proposed regulation defines a “transformation event” as “the introduction into an organism of 
genetic material that has been manipulated in vitro.” Id. at 4734. 
 34. Id. at 4713. The FDA illustrates this exemption by stating, “[A] separate notice would 
be required, for example, if herbicide tolerance introduced into a variety of sweet corn that is 
used solely for human food is subsequently transferred, using traditional plant-breeding 
techniques, to a variety of field corn that would also be used in food intended for consumption 
by animals.” Id. From this example, it is unclear what is included in this exemption. Perhaps if 
an rDNA bioengineered characteristic were transferred via “traditional” techniques from one 
food intended for human consumption to another food intended for human consumption, then 
an additional submission would not be required.  
[T]he notification requirement would not extend to bioengineered food obtained from 
a plant line (or series of plant lines) that derives from a particular transformation event, 
as long as both the applicable transformation and the use or application of the 
bioengineered food has been addressed satisfactorily in a completed consultation under 
the voluntary program.  
Id. 
 35. Premarket Notice Concerning Bioengineered Foods, 66 Fed. Reg. at 4713. 
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food supply,36 voluntarily submit to consultation to ensure that the 
products are not harmful.37  
Information that developers disclose in either the consultation or 
premarket notice processes will generally become public record 
under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”).38 If a developer 
demonstrates that the information is exempt from FOIA, because it is 
a trade secret or is otherwise privileged or confidential, then the 
developer may submit a redacted statement for public disclosure.39 
The fact that the developer has either consulted with the FDA or has 
provided premarket notice, however, will not be kept confidential.40  
Regardless of whether developers choose to participate in the 
optional consulting process, the proposed premarket notification 
process still requires developers to submit highly detailed information 
to the FDA regarding the bioengineered food.41 The FDA expects 
developers who participate in the optional consulting process to 
 
 36. Non-food but food-related uses include pharmaceuticals, oral vaccines, and plant-
derived products used for industrial applications. Id. at 4714. 
 37. Id. at 4714-15. The FDA suggests that voluntary compliance with the consulting 
process for non-food developers would advise the developers of their responsibility and 
potential liability. Id. 
 38. Id. at 4714. 
 39. Id.  
 40. Id. The FDA models this policy decision on public disclosure of APHIS’s request for 
testing permits. In most cases an APHIS request for testing permit would precede this 
premarket notification process so that developers’ new products would already be public. Id.  
 41. The FDA requests seven pieces of information. Premarket Notice Concerning 
Bioengineered Foods, 66 Fed. Reg. at 4732, § 192.25. First, the developer must draft a letter 
that includes an assurance of the proposed product’s safety, as well as assurances of cooperation 
with the FDA. Id. Second, the developer must include contact information as well as 
information about the proposed product, including a description of the introduced genetic 
material, proposed uses for the product, and uses “not suitable” for the product. Id. Third, the 
developer must list the status of the proposed product with respect to other administrative 
agencies and foreign governments (including whether or not the developer has received a 
permit from APHIS). Id. Fourth, the developer must describe the methods used to develop the 
proposed product, including relevant information about the parent plant, the design of the 
vector, and the location of the transferred genetic material. Id. at 4733. Fifth, the developer 
must disclose the use of antibiotic resistance as a tag for insertion. Further, the FDA 
“recommends that you contact [it] about the agency’s current thinking on this topic.” Id. Sixth, 
the developer must discuss any additional substances present in the proposed product as a result 
of genetic modification, including safety concerns and possible allergenic effects, if relevant 
(the FDA again recommends that developers seek guidance on this subject). Id. Finally, the 
developer must provide a comprehensive comparison between the proposed product and a 
“comparable food,” including nutritional information, historical uses, toxin levels, and general 
safety information. Id. 
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spend approximately 190 hours preparing the required reports. This is 
forty hours more than the FDA expects under the current, voluntary 
program.42 At the FDA’s estimated cost of seventy-eight dollars per 
hour, premarket disclosure for one product would cost approximately 
$15,000 in report preparation time alone. The FDA estimates that 
developers who do not complete the optional consultation process 
will spend approximately 275 hours preparing the premarket 
disclosure reports, at a cost of approximately $21,000.43 The 
additional costs that are associated with forgoing the consultation 
process arise because a developer in that position would have to 
submit documents describing the process of collecting the disclosure 
information in addition to the disclosure itself. The FDA has 
determined that the proposed regulation would have “a significant 
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.”44 
Nevertheless, because the proposed regulation allows developers to 
request consultation meetings by telephone instead of in person, the 
FDA has determined that the rule provides sufficient flexibility to 
protect the interests of small businesses.45 
C. Bioengineered Food and the Precautionary Principle: Premarket 
Notification as Insufficient to Ensure Product Safety 
One view of the United States’ regulation of bioengineered food is 
that the U.S. should more closely follow the Precautionary Principle, 
the risk management model espoused by much of the international 
community, including the European Union.46 American legal scholars 
 
 42. 66 Fed. Reg. at 4726. 
 43. Id. at 4729. 
 44. Id. at 4729. Under the Regulatory Flexibility Act, agencies must seek to minimize 
adverse economic effects of regulations on small entities. Id. at 4729 (citing 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-
602). A “small entity,” for purposes of the Regulatory Flexibility Act, is a business with fewer 
than 500 employees or less than five million dollars in annual receipts. Although, to date, only 
one “small entity” has requested premarket consultation with the FDA, the FDA realizes that 
many potential developers of bioengineered foods may qualify as “small entities.” Id. 
 45. Premarket Notice Concerning Bioengineered Foods, 66 Fed. Reg. at 4729. The 
proposed regulation also requests comments on additional measures to make the rule more 
flexible for small entities. Id. 
 46. Some industrialized countries, such as China, have taken a positive view of 
bioengineered food products. Others, like Brazil, have outlawed bioengineered products 
altogether. See Neil D. Hamilton, Legal Issues Shaping Society’s Acceptance of Biotechnology 
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who subscribe to this view believe that the FDA fails to take 
appropriate measures to protect consumers from the unintended 
adverse effects of bioengineering. Roughly stated, the Precautionary 
Principle is the concept that when there is an unknown level of risk 
with respect to a given potential hazard, the potential hazard must be 
subject to regulations that are significantly more restrictive than is 
apparently necessary. These more restrictive regulations are supposed 
to protect against unforeseen harm.47  
One supporter of the Precautionary Principle is Professor Vern R. 
Walker, of the Hofstra University School of Law.48 According to 
Professor Walker, current FDA regulations regarding bioengineered 
food rely solely on developers for identifying substances that are not 
GRAS and that may qualify as “food additives” for purposes of the 
Coordinated Framework.49 As a result, he says, “[T]he vast majority 
of genetically modified foods have not triggered any required FDA 
review or regulation.”50 If developers do not declare that the 
 
and Genetically Modified Organisms, 6 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 81, 90 (2001). 
 47. For a contrary viewpoint, see Christopher D. Stone, Is There a Precautionary 
Principle?, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10790 (2001). Professor Stone asserts that discussion of “the” 
Precautionary Principle is an oversimplification of a wide array of risk management strategies. 
He gives several examples of attempted articulations of the Precautionary Principle, some of 
which prohibit actions whose outcomes are not “fully understood,” one that prohibits 
“unacceptable harm to the environment,” and another that favorably (and perhaps ironically) 
refers to cost-effectiveness. Id. at 10790-91 (citing G. A. Res. 37/7, U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., 
Supp. No. 51, at 17, U.N. Doc. A/37/51 (1982), reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 458 (1983); Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development, June 14, 1992, princ. 15, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.151/5 (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 874, 879 (1992); James Cameron and Julie 
Abouchar, The Precautionary Principle: A Fundamental Principle of Law and Policy for the 
Protection of the Global Environment, 14 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 3 (1991)). Professor 
Stone also suggests a connection between invocation of the Precautionary Principle and trade 
protectionism: “In the trade area, most prominently, there is concern that, as long as the 
Precautionary Principle remains nebulous, trading nations will mask as ‘precautionary health 
protection measures’ border controls actually designed to shield domestic producers from 
foreign competition.” Stone, supra at 10791.  
 48. See, e.g., Vern R. Walker, Some Dangers of Taking Precautions Without Adopting the 
Precautionary Principle: A Critique of Food Safety Regulation in the United States, 31 ENVTL. 
L. REP. 10040 (2001) (stating that “although precautionary measures for achieving food safety 
in the United States are some of the oldest and most successful in the world, even such 
measures fall short when they are evaluated from the unifying perspective of the Precautionary 
[P]rinciple.”). 
 49. Id. at 10043. 
 50. Id. (citing NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMMITTEE ON GENETICALLY MODIFIED 
PEST-PROTECTED PLANTS, GENETICALLY MODIFIED PEST-PROTECTED PLANTS: SCIENCE AND 
REGULATION 29 (2000)). 
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bioengineered foods they produce contain “food additives,” or if they 
fail to announce that some technique employed during development 
is not GRAS, then the product will not trigger precautionary review.51 
In response to the proposition that GRAS status should be per se 
sufficient to avoid regulatory review, Professor Walker points out 
that the FDA strictly regulates certain categories of food additives, 
such as color additives, without exception for GRAS status.52 
Professor Walker proposes an across-the-board risk management 
model as rigorous as Congress’s regulation of carcinogens in the 
Delaney Clauses.53 The level of protection for carcinogenic pesticide 
residues must be “to a reasonable certainty that no harm will 
result,”54 which Congress defined as “a lifetime risk no greater than 
one in one million, calculated using conservative assumptions.”55 
Other substances covered under the Delaney Clauses have a “zero 
tolerance” level of protection.56 Professor Walker believes a 
“reasonable certainty” standard would be more appropriate than the 
current, less rigorous GRAS standards for genetically modified 
food.57 Such a model would reflect the Precautionary Principle 
because it weighs the risks and benefits of a given substance and sets 
a level of protection accordingly.58 Professor Walker argues that 
using multiple standards for different types of harmful substances 
based on potential economic consequences is a dilution of the 
 
 51. Id. at 10044. Professor Walker is skeptical of GRAS status because of the broad 
latitude it can provide a bioengineered food product. For instance, as compared with a color 
additive, “[t]he permissive trigger for genetically modified foods has the potential to leave 
many such foods unreviewed by the FDA.” Id. at 10043-44. 
 52. Id. at 10043.  
 53. Id. at 10042 (citing 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 348(c)(3)(A), 360b(d)(1)(I), 379e(b)(5)(B) 
(2000)). 
 54. Id. at 10042. 
 55. Id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 104-669, pt. 2, at 41 (1996) (“It is the Committee’s 
understanding that, under current EPA practice . . . EPA interprets a negligible risk to be a one-
in-a-million lifetime risk.”)).  
 56. Walker, supra note 48, at 10042. “If a food additive, for example, is found to induce 
cancer when ingested by animals, then the FDA has no discretion to approve that additive as 
safe.” Id. 
 57. “The Precautionary Principle would itself provide a justification for a conservative 
trigger. . . . Moreover, the burden should be on the government to justify any departures from 
this protective trigger in the case of food.” Id. at 10044. 
 58. Id. 
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Precautionary Principle, and thwarts the effectiveness of consistent 
cost-benefit analysis.59  
D. Product Stewardship and Economic Efficiency: Premarket 
Notification as Beneficial to the Bioengineered Food Industry in the 
United States 
Stanley H. Abramson and J. Thomas Carrato60 describe the policy 
view of the major U.S. developers of bioengineered food. Such 
developers have voluntarily consulted with the FDA since 1992.61 
Abramson and Carrato take the position that both the government and 
private industry should share the responsibility for ensuring the safety 
of bioengineered food.62 They believe that additional regulation, such 
as the proposed regulation, should be part of an ongoing discussion 
process rather than a total policy shift.63 They state that, while 
government agencies must rigorously review new products according 
to “clear, consistent rules,” developers must also assess the safety of 
their own products, both before and after they go to market.64 The 
crux of this position involves extensive “product stewardship” by 
corporations and through industry cooperation. As product stewards, 
 
 59. Id. at 10045:  
Perhaps lawmakers think that it is more reassuring to the public if they pretend that 
determining acceptable levels of food risk is always a purely scientific matter, instead 
of a management decision involving costs and benefits. But adopting the Precautionary 
Principle would mean placing a higher value on acknowledging scientific uncertainty 
and on transparency, and placing the burden of proof on those who would trade off 
protection against benefits. 
 60. Mr. Abramson’s biographical note describes him, in part, as “a principal drafter of the 
Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology during his tenure at the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency.” Stanley H. Abramson & J. Thomas Carrato, Crop 
Biotechnology: The Case for Product Stewardship, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 241, 241 n.a1 (2001). 
Mr. Carrato’s biographical note describes him as “Assistant General Counsel for Regulatory 
Affairs with Monsanto Company in St. Louis, Missouri, and co-chair [of] the company’s Health 
and Environmental Stewardship Council.” Id. at n.a2.  
 61. Premarket Notice Concerning Bioengineered Foods, 66 Fed. Reg. at 4704 (proposed 
January 18, 2001). 
 62. Abramson & Carrato, supra note 60. 
 63. Id. at 266. 
 64. Id.  
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developers take responsibility to provide products and technologies 
that are “safe as well as socially and environmentally responsible.”65  
According to Abramson and Carrato, private developers of 
bioengineered foods are not opposed to significant government 
regulation.66 They believe that government regulation serves valuable 
functions, including assuring developers and the public of product 
safety.67 Developers also undertake exhaustive risk analysis, 
however, including a scientific assessment of the possible risks 
associated with the product. Because private industry bears 
responsibility68 if a product causes any public harm, bioengineered 
food developers have significant incentive to minimize all assessed 
risks.69 In addition to safety risks, Abramson and Carrato believe that 
developers, rather than governments, are best able to manage the 
environmental and social concerns regarding their products post-
market.70 
Abramson and Carrato claim that the United States has taken a 
“middle ground” approach in regulating bioengineered food.71 This 
 
 65. Id. at 259. 
 66.  “Rigorous, science-based safety assessments must be conducted for each new product 
or product category, first by the product developers and then by agency scientists.” Id. at 266. 
 67. Id. at 241. 
 68. In addition to civil liability, bioengineered food developers must also consider factors 
including “health, safety, environmental, and agricultural impacts; regulatory acceptance; 
public acceptance . . . [and] market acceptance.” Id. at 262. The developer must assess and 
minimize each potential risk before marketing any new bioengineered food. Id.  
 69. See id. at 262. See also Charles A. Deacon & Emilie K. Paterson, Emerging Trends in 
Biotechnology, 20 REV. LITIG. 589, 597 (2001). Without clear regulation, an increase in 
litigation and in plaintiffs’ damages may complicate the development of bioengineered food. Id. 
The safety standards that courts apply in tort liability may not reflect the FDA’s standards for 
bioengineered foods. Id. Deacon and Paterson explain that this disparity could result in 
diverging statutory and common law duties for developers of bioengineered foods.  
Hypothetically, where a defendant could demonstrate that it has FDA approval or has 
stayed within FDA guidelines, the plaintiff could possibly try to establish that the 
FDA’s standard is less stringent than the duties owed under common law in order to 
demonstrate liability. Biotech companies cannot rely on federal regulatory approval to 
create a shield from liability. 
Id. at 598.  
 70. Abramson & Carrato, supra note 60, at 266. 
 71. Id. at 245. On the other hand, at the international level, some authors believe that the 
European Union’s position on biotechnology constitutes a “middle ground” when compared 
with the positions of other international groups. See, e.g., David J. Schnier, Genetically 
Modified Organisms and the Cartagena Protocol, 12 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 377, 404 (2001); 
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“middle ground” involves more regulation than what is called for by 
those believing that genetic engineering is no more hazardous than 
traditional plant breeding. But the approach reflects the view that 
excessive government oversight may inhibit technical advances.72 
Accordingly, the middle ground approach favors regulations that are 
less restrictive than those that the European Union and other 
followers of the Precautionary Principle have implemented, which 
seek to exclude products from the market until they meet a zero risk 
standard.73 Abramson and Carrato contend that current regulation, as 
promulgated in the Coordinated Framework, regulates bioengineered 
food but still allows many bioengineered products to reach the 
marketplace.74 Regarding the purpose of the Coordinated Framework, 
Abramson and Carrato say that “[t]his cautionary approach was 
adopted primarily in response to public perception rather than any 
inherent danger associated with the technology.”75 
E. Industrial Autonomy as Sufficient to Ensure the Safety of the Food 
Supply 
Some observers of the biotechnology industry believe that, 
optimally, developers would manage the risks of their bioengineered 
food products voluntarily and independently of regulation.76 Thomas 
 
Gareth W. Schweizer, Note, The Negotiation of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, 6 ENVTL. 
LAW. 577, 588 (2000). 
 72. Abramson & Carrato, supra note 60, at 244-45. More than three thousand scientists, 
including two Nobel Prize winners (James Watson and Norman Bourlaug), have signed a letter 
indicating their support of biotechnology and genetically modified food. Schnier, supra note 71, 
at 382 (citing Petition from C.S. Prakash, Prof., Tuskeegee University, to Scientific Comm., 
AgBio World, Scientists in Support of Agricultural Biotechnology, available at http://www. 
agbioworld.org/PHP/index_all.phtml (last visited, Jan. 11, 2003)).  
 73. Abramson & Carrato, supra note 60, at 244-245 (citing Frank B. Cross, Paradoxical 
Perils of the Precautionary Principle, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 851 (1996)). 
 74. Id. at 245. See also supra note 3. 
 75. Abramson & Carrato, supra note 60, at 246. 
 76. Thomas P. Redick & Christina G. Bernstein, Nuisance Law and the Prevention of 
“Genetic Pollution”: Declining a Dinner Date with Damocles, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10328 
(2000). Redick and Bernstein posit that nuisance law could act as an alternative to strict anti-
biotechnology legislation in international food markets:  
Commentators have suggested for years that public nuisance law provides an ideal 
mechanism for regulating the environmental impacts of biotechnology because it 
provides an existing legal framework that could prevent threats to the environment 
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P. Redick and Christina G. Bernstein, scholars in biotechnology risk 
management, believe that comprehensive voluntary stewardship 
would have both domestic and international benefits for developers 
and growers.77 At the domestic level, under a purely voluntary 
system, developers and growers would be able to contract freely and 
plant crops of their own choosing. They would thereby maximize the 
benefits of bioengineered foods.78  
Redick and Bernstein suggest that, at the international level, 
product stewardship could support differing objectives depending on 
the existing legislation of countries that import U.S. products.79 In the 
 
before they occur. . . . [P]ublic nuisance law provides a model system that could be 
used to streamline the approval process in developing countries lacking an adequate 
environmental regulatory system, provided there is a system of adjudication . . . 
capable of resolving a threat posed by GMOs. 
Id. at 10336 (citing Daniel P. Larsen, Combatting the Exotic Species Invasion: the Role of Tort 
Liability, 5 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 21 (1995)). Such an approach might supplant a 
Precautionary Principle-type zero-risk standard with a “more cost-effective, immediate solution 
to threats of GMOs.” Redick & Bernstein, supra at 10336. These authors suggest that this 
approach would be appropriate for countries that wish to receive the benefits of bioengineered 
foods but lack the resources for full-scale regulation as in the European Union. Id.  
 77. Redick and Bernstein propose a six-step “production scheme” for bioengineered food 
developers who wish to engage in international trade: 
1. [S]ecure regulatory approval in major overseas markets before marketing new GMO 
varieties; 
2. [W]here regulatory approval cannot be secured, establish a segregated stream of 
commerce to prevent the commingling of unapproved varieties with export-approved 
varieties; 
3. [P]romote the establishment of reasonable “tolerance levels” (e.g., up to 5 percent 
unapproved GMO content) in foreign markets that are wary of new GMOs; 
4. [S]pecify appropriately conservative distances for avoiding significant outcrossing; 
5. [E]stablish methods for monitoring outcrossing; and 
6. [M]anage grower incentives and conduct so the system works as planned. 
Redick & Bernstein, supra note 76, at 10341. 
 78. Id. at 10330. “There is still time to maintain a voluntary approach to managing 
nuisance risks before the cyclones of litigation or state legislation blow away contracts and the 
freedom of growers to plant the crop of their choice.” Id. This freedom to contract would allow 
growers and developers to make agreements “optimized to local conditions and the needs of the 
parties to the contract.” Id. at 10341 (citing Thomas P. Redick et al., Private Legal Mechanisms 
for Regulating the Risks of Genetically Modified Organisms: An Alternative Path Within the 
Biosafety Protocol, 4 ENVTL. L. 52 (1997)). 
 79. U.S. exporters would adhere, at minimum, to industry standards. Redick & Bernstein, 
supra note 76, at 10341. 
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European Union, for example, rigid legislation governs 
bioengineered food. American developers thus face significant 
regulatory obstacles to importing crops for sale, whether 
bioengineered or otherwise.80 Developing countries, on the other 
hand, may wish to import such goods, but may lack even rudimentary 
regulation to protect themselves from injury.81 The former situation 
might require developers of bioengineered food to adapt their 
practices to standards that are more rigorous than those in the United 
States.82 The latter situation would require developers to adhere to 
appropriate safety standards, so as not to create environmental or 
health hazards. In both cases, the incentive to self-impose additional 
regulation arises from the developer’s interest in safely marketing its 
products around the world.83 An important aspect of self-imposed 
regulation is that developers and producers must rigorously adhere to 
 
 80. Id. at 10332. For an in-depth discussion of these laws, see Terence P. Stewart & David 
S. Johanson, Policy in Flux: The European Union’s Laws on Agricultural Biotechnology and 
Their Effects on International Trade, 4 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 243 (1999). Genetically modified 
food imported to the European Union must satisfy two main laws: “The first such law, Council 
Directive 90/220/EEC, concerns . . . GMO products that may be described as raw materials. 
The second law, Regulation No. 258/97, applies to . . . ‘novel foods,’ including foods 
containing GMOs.” Id. at 256. Council Directive 90/220/EEC, Part C, describes requirements 
for placing bioengineered food products on the European market (including foods imported 
from the United States). Id. at 256-57. First, the importer (who could be a developer, 
manufacturer, producer, etc.) must provide an application involving extensive disclosure to the 
state in which the importer proposes selling the goods. Id. If the member state reviews and 
approves the application, it must forward the application to all of the other member states in the 
European Union, any of whom may object, triggering a vote on the proposal. Id. at 258-59. 
Once a product has received approval in this process, the importer may market it, with 
identifying labeling, throughout the European Union with no further notification, though any 
individual state may request a “provisional restriction” barring the product from its own 
borders. Id. at 259-60. Regulation No. 258/97 operates in essentially the same way, though it 
requires additional submission of safety studies. Id. at 279. 
 81. Redick & Bernstein, supra note 76, at 10335. 
 82. Id. at 10341. Logically, developers must take responsibility for apprising themselves 
of potential regulatory hurdles: “The loss of substantial investment costs to the seed 
manufacturer who develops a product line that cannot reach its intended market due to the 
threat of liability can be avoided by careful planning.” Id.  
 83. See id.: 
[I]ndustry efforts at coordinated stewardship should be initiated on a global basis to 
ensure that unreasonable releases of GM crops do not occur. In the final analysis, it is 
in the agricultural biotechnology industry’s best interest to develop and adhere to its 
own set of reasonable standards for identity-preserved chains of commerce. 
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procedures, lest “one bad apple” cause environmental 
contamination.84 
A voluntary program of industry stewardship, say these authors, 
would protect the industry against the arbitrary actions of government 
authorities. Their concern is that such authorities may implement 
standards hostile to bioengineered foods based on subjective criteria 
or on misinformation.85  
Other scholars believe that the failure of corporations to develop 
and use bioengineered foods would result in significant social, 
economic, and environmental harm.86 Professor Drew L. Kershen of 
the University of Oklahoma College of Law further suggests that 
nations, as well as corporations, who fail to embrace biotechnology 
are guilty of scientific ignorance.87 He poses several admittedly 
improbable examples of consequences that could occur given certain 
corporations’ current opposition to bioengineered food.88 Professor 
 
 84. “The ‘One Bad Apple’ effect takes the ‘tragedy of the commons’ that gave birth to 
environmental law to a new level: the entire chain of commerce in a particular crop . . . can be 
ruined by . . . a single grower who is oblivious to the risk.” Id. 
 85. Id. at 10330 (contending that government authorities “may be misinformed, angry, or 
otherwise unsympathetic to the environmental and economic benefits of present and future 
GMOs”). 
 86. Drew L. Kershen, Essay: The Risks of Going Non-GMO, 53 OKLA. L. REV. 631, 633 
(2000). 
 87. Id. at 633. 
 88. The risks of forgoing bioengineered products in favor of traditional products are 
threefold, finds Professor Kershen, as “[t]wo risks entail legal accountability[, while] the third 
risk is a societal risk with legal implications. Those three risks are: the risk of legal liability for 
damages; the risk of environmental [non]compliance; and the risk of scientific ignorance.” Id. at 
632-33. In one example, Gerber (the baby food producer and subsidiary of Novartis, a major 
developer of bioengineered products), has ceased to use genetically modified components in its 
products in response to public pressure. Id. at 633. Professor Kershen suggests a circumstance 
in which a baby develops cancer due to carcinogenic toxins that are present in “organic” foods, 
but are reduced in certain bioengineered foods. Id. at 634. Gerber, he suggests, could incur 
product liability because it “knew of a baby food designed . . . with less risky ingredients and 
purposefully chose to use the riskier design—i.e., Gerber chose to use [non-bioengineered] 
ingredients knowing that these have a higher risk of [toxin] contamination.” Id. at 635. 
 In another example, because “anti-biotech” groups successfully pressured several major 
fast food chains to stop using bioengineered potatoes, farmers who supply the fast food chains 
with potatoes have ceased, or dramatically reduced, planting such crops. Id. at 637-39. The 
benefit of the modified (NewLeaf™) potato is that it is resistant to certain types of insects, 
thereby reducing the need for pesticides. Id. Professor Kershen suggests that the fast food 
chains’ refusal to buy genetically modified potatoes could lead to an environmental crisis 
because potato farmers continue to contaminate the environment with pesticides which could 
have been avoided by use of the pest-resistant, genetically modified potato. Id. 
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Kershen’s key proposition is that governments89 and public opinion90 
ought not dissuade bioengineered food developers from the scientific 
pursuit of safe, nutritious, and environmentally sound products.91 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Bioengineered Food and the Precautionary Principle: Premarket 
Notification as Insufficient to Ensure Product Safety 
Proponents of the Precautionary Principle believe that premarket 
notification, as proposed, is merely a token gesture, and that 
immediate promulgation of comprehensive regulation is necessary to 
protect food safety in the United States.92 According to these critics, 
the United States prides itself on having a safe food supply but exerts 
relatively little force over developers of bioengineered foods.93 For 
example, in stark contrast to the European Union’s strict policies 
regarding bioengineered foods,94 the United States relies on 
 
 89. In his description of the Italian Agriculture Minister, Professor Kershen discusses a 
possible consequence of the repression of biotechnology: “Italy is at risk not only of falling 
behind in the rapidly advancing science of biotechnology but also of abandoning the freedom of 
scientific inquiry. If twenty-first century societies adopt scientific ignorance as a basis for 
decisions, then scientific method and scientific research are the early victims.” Id. at 649.  
 90. Professor Kershen points out that the most vocal opponents to bioengineered food are 
“among wealthy classes . . . who very likely will never go hungry.” At the same time, he says 
that “[t]hese same consumers know that they will be ill . . . and wealthy consumers have 
warmly and openly embraced pharmaceutical biotechnology.” Id. at 651. See also Michael 
Siegrist, Poorer European Countries are Less Concerned About Biotechnology than Richer 
Countries, 12 RISK: ISSUES HEALTH & SAFETY 29 (2001) (A statistical analysis of public 
opinion regarding bioengineered food in all fifteen members of the European Union showed a 
strong inverse proportionality between GNP and public confidence in the safety of 
bioengineered food). 
 91. Kershen, supra note 86, at 651.  
 92. In addition to the legal scholars discussed in Part II.C, some consumer groups also 
hold this position, including the Public Interest Research Group (PIRG). For a summary of 
PIRG’s position on the proposed regulation, see Press Release, New FDA Policy Fails to 
Require Testing or Labeling of Genetically Engineered Food, Jan. 17, 2001, at 
http://www.pirg.org/ge/GE.asp?id2=4806&id3=ge& (last visited Jan. 11, 2003). For a summary 
of PIRG’s position on bioengineered foods in general, see Richard Caplan, Chew on This, 
CHARLESTON GAZETTE-MAIL, at 1C, Apr. 8, 2001, available at http://www.pirg.org/ge/reports/ 
gefoodoped.pdf (last visited Jan. 11, 2003). 
 93. See Walker, supra note 48, at 10040.  
 94. Stewart & Johanson, supra note 80. An important consideration upon review of 
European policy is whether restrictions on bioengineered products are truly a result of concern 
about safety, or whether the restrictions might reflect protectionist attitudes and a desire to 
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developers themselves to notify the government when their products 
may be unsafe.95 At its very worst, this disparity could result in the 
cessation of the global trade in American agricultural products, 
resulting from an international disapproval and mistrust of the 
products’ safety.96  
In a similarly dramatic worst-case scenario, proponents of the 
Precautionary Principle worry that without appropriate government 
regulation of bioengineered foods, the American marketplace could 
embrace the benefits of bioengineered foods without adequately 
assessing the risk associated with them.97 After an initial rapid 
expansion of the industry, subsequent adverse safety findings could 
result in a sudden and disabling exposure of the bioengineered food 
industry to tort liability. Such a scenario would quash the research 
and development of bioengineered foods, and deprive the American 
 
remove cheaper competition. See generally Stone, supra note 47. If Europeans opposed to 
biotechnology developed their viewpoints through information promulgated by traditional food 
producers, the information might suggest such a link. Furthermore, the relative wealth of 
European nations might explain some other aversion to bioengineered foods but not to 
bioengineered pharmaceutical products. See Kershen, supra note 86, at 651. This apparent 
double standard might support the proposition that Europeans do not mistrust biotechnology 
outright, but rather maintain their bias against it out of the belief that it is unnecessary.  
 95. Walker, supra note 48, at 10043. Disclosure to the government of recombinant DNA 
products is voluntary under current regulations. The proposed regulation would require 
disclosure of these bioengineered products. See supra note 32. Even with the passage of the 
proposed regulation, however, some bioengineered products could still fall within exemptions 
from disclosure. Id. These exemptions would include previously certified transformation events, 
products employing previously submitted applications of bioengineered food, and products for 
which the FDA has already issued a letter of compliance (either under the mandatory process 
proposed in the rule, or under the current voluntary consulting process). Id. The exemptions that 
would remain after enactment of the proposed regulation are much smaller than current 
exemptions from premarket regulation.  
 96. In an unlikely example, if the rest of the world adopted the Precautionary Principle 
(which requires strict labeling in addition to regulation of development) and the United States 
continued its current practices, American producers of traditional and bioengineered foods 
would be unable to compete in the global market. A more likely scenario involves a significant 
disadvantage for the United States in trading with wealthy industrialized nations who have 
adopted the Precautionary Principle, though opportunities in technology-favorable nations such 
as China would be unharmed. See Hamilton, supra note 46, at 100-02. 
 97. Such a possibility is the essence of a Precautionary Principle argument. These scholars 
argue that where risks could be unknown, simply taking precautions against known risks cannot 
logically be sufficient. See Walker, supra note 48, at 10040. As a practical matter, however, 
individuals, companies, and governments must always submit to unknown risks. A cost-benefit 
analysis to determine an appropriate safety margin remains the usual measure of protection 
against known risks as well as an aggregate unknown risk. Id. at 10044. 
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and international communities of their possible benefits. 
In order to satisfy proponents of the Precautionary Principle, the 
FDA would have to adopt far more extensive regulation than what is 
currently proposed.98 The government would likely have to oversee 
each stage involved in bringing a bioengineered product to market. 
This would include the strict observation of developers, 
farmer/growers, storage facilities, and purchasers of agricultural 
products. Regardless of whether a product was genetically modified, 
it could proceed to processing as food or feed only with an airtight 
pedigree. Possible effects of this sort of policy would include 
commensurately higher prices for consumers on all types of 
domestically produced food, as well as greater costs for exporting the 
products. If products imported from other countries did not adhere to 
the same production rules as domestic products, they could afford to 
charge lower prices. Even if imported products had price protections 
to make them competitive with domestic products, export of the more 
costly American products to a nation with lighter restrictions would 
be unprofitable. Such regulation would, therefore, create a 
competitive disadvantage for American food producers, especially 
farmer/growers.99  
B. Product Stewardship and Economic Efficiency: Premarket 
Notification as Beneficial to the Bioengineered Food Industry in the 
United States 
Large corporations and the federal government often seem to 
embrace the view that they should cooperate in order to maximize 
 
 98. See Id. at 10043, arguing that the “conservative trigger” applied by the government to 
color additives in food is superior to the broad reach of the GRAS standard which removes a 
wide variety of products from governmental scrutiny. The “conservative trigger” would not 
exempt products already in use, nor products that contain only very small amounts of the 
regulated substance. 
 99. The increased expense to farmer/growers arises due to the administrative costs they 
would incur in monitoring the pedigree of their products, whether the products were 
bioengineered or traditional. Whether producing or selling traditional or bioengineered 
products, each person or company through whom agricultural products flowed would have to 
maintain documentation in order to ensure that the two types of products never mixed with each 
other. Furthermore, as producers, farmer/growers would bear many of the costs associated with 
a more complicated contract system for the sale of agricultural products. 
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both the economic benefits and safety of bioengineered foods.100 
Under such a scheme, corporations would conduct extensive testing 
of their own products and would make regular, detailed reports to 
federal agencies, which would maintain vast databases of relevant 
information.101 While the government would strive to encourage new 
developments in bioengineered food, corporations would exert 
pressure on legislators to ensure the promulgation of extensive but 
favorable regulations.102 
This approach would preclude many of the potential problems of 
embracing the Precautionary Principle. The industry would be able to 
continue to develop new, safe products and bring them to market 
without fear of oppression by zero-risk-tolerant policies. Further, by 
adopting regulations that would be sufficient to ensure safety, but less 
radical than those advocated by Europe, the exporters of United 
States food products would not suffer from the higher production 
costs of adhering to the Precautionary Principle.103 
On the other hand, this approach, which centers on cooperation 
between large developers and the federal government, leaves little 
room for smaller developers who may be crippled by the costly 
measures proposed by the FDA.104 These companies may not even 
have products on the market yet, and may lack the administrative 
funds or corporate personnel to pursue certification.105 To retain the 
benefits of industry and government cooperation while protecting the 
American tradition of entrepreneurship and competition, United 
 
 100. See Abramson & Carrato, supra note 60, at 242.  
 101. Id. at 266. 
 102. Id. at 264. 
 103. Ideally, producers who wished to trade in Europe could adopt European procedures of 
their own accord, but they would not have to charge higher prices across the board where only a 
fraction of the market required the more strenuous regulation. These producers might choose to 
adhere to a “crop production scheme” like that suggested by Redick and Bernstein for use in a 
regulatory environment of industry autonomy. See supra note 77. 
 104. See supra note 44. These “small” companies are not necessarily family businesses 
lacking in sophistication. For statutory purposes they have revenues of up to five million dollars 
and have as many as 500 employees. For a company of the maximum size, the $21,000 
expected cost of premarket certification would be roughly one-half of one percent of the annual 
revenue. Where a company is smaller than that, however, particularly considering the tight 
margins under which start-up type companies are known to operate, the costs of the certification 
could be prohibitive. 
 105. See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.  
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States policy on bioengineered foods must be flexible and efficient.106 
The current regulatory climate closely resembles this approach to 
biotechnology regulation. Therefore, the proposed regulation would 
likely have only a small effect on present-day farmer/growers, food 
processors, and consumers. Nearly all developers of bioengineered 
food in the United States are large corporations that already 
participate in the voluntary consulting process. Thus, the only 
substantial additional burden imposed by the rule would be a 
requirement to file disclosure documents.107 While these requirements 
are considerable in themselves, their administrative costs may be 
distributed across the enormous number of producers and 
farmer/growers who purchase seed for each product that is 
considered for certification. 
C. Industrial Autonomy as Sufficient to Ensure the Safety of the Food 
Supply 
Some observers of the bioengineered food industry advocate 
industrial autonomy, especially with respect to international trade.108 
In the same way that the adoption of the Precautionary Principle 
 
 106. See Geistfeld, supra note 3, at 187. In pursuit of an efficient regulation mechanism of 
bioengineered products, a cost-benefit analysis should, of course, include safety concerns. It 
should also consider costs to consumers as well as costs to developers and producers. Professor 
Geistfeld would find labeling issues (not examined herein) central to the safety side of the 
analysis, because they are dispositive of consumer assumption of risk. See supra notes 2-3. 
From the economic side of the analysis, a system that imposes equal costs on each product that 
potentially enters the market, regardless of the size of its likely market, does not satisfy an 
equitable cost-benefit analysis. Participants in the industry should share in the costs to the 
extent that they contribute to the risk. Thus, greater participants in the industry would bear a 
greater share of the costs of ensuring safety. Small companies with relatively slight market 
participation should bear a smaller share of the costs. Though both large and small developers 
of successfully certified products would have an opportunity to pass their costs to consumers, a 
product with a larger consumer base would pass on a marginally smaller share of the cost. 
Smaller companies with less market penetration would still bear negative effects in such a case.  
 Costs, then, of the proposed regulation, as it is currently stated, include the administrative 
costs of compliance as well as possible anticompetitive effects on small companies. Benefits of 
the proposed regulation might include greater assurance of food safety for domestic consumers, 
protection against liability for developers of bioengineered foods, and possibly a slightly more 
favorable position in the international market for bioengineered foods (depending on whether 
the rule itself is potent enough to have any effect in the global arena). 
 107. Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-602 (2000). See also supra note 44 and 
accompanying text. 
 
 108. See generally Redick & Bernstein, supra note 76. 
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would make American seed stock or American-grown produce 
prohibitively expensive for less wealthy nations, voluntary product 
stewardship would permit developers and producers to do business in 
such countries.109 In fact, voluntary product stewardship would allow 
developers latitude to provide products that would adhere to the 
standards of any country with which they wished to transact. Instead 
of adherence to a single, prohibitively costly FDA standard 
applicable to all bioengineered products produced in the United 
States, the industry could employ a sliding scale of price and product 
restrictions depending on the location of intended consumption.110 
Such cooperation would maximize competition in the global 
marketplace, as the most restrictive countries would no longer be able 
to establish standards for the rest of the world. 
Industrial autonomy in the global marketplace would provide a 
market efficiency greater than any uniform standard could achieve. 
Without the proposed regulation, or others like it, consumers would 
 
 109. Id. Through Redick and Bernstein’s six-step “production scheme,” developers could 
efficiently transact with both of these groups. Id. at 10341. A key benefit of industrial autonomy 
is the maximal freedom of contract for both developers and consumers. Id. at 10330. Without 
government restrictions on labeling for example, or with use restrictions requested by the 
developer, buyers can procure the lowest possible price. A drawback of this policy would be a 
disparity of bargaining power between negotiating parties, which could lead to unfair contracts. 
Developers of bioengineered products who desired to transact with less sophisticated buyers 
would have to take great pains to ensure that the deal was fair. With regard to remedies 
available in case of a developer corporation’s misconduct, the premise of Redick and 
Bernstein’s proposal is that nuisance law, both public and private, can apply to corporations 
expanding into markets without biotechnology regulation. Though nuisance law may provide an 
enforcement mechanism against developers who transact irresponsibly, thereby causing damage 
to the local environment, developers may find themselves in the position of dealing with 
farmer/growers who are unwilling to follow environmental precautions. Under these 
circumstances, without governmental support of the necessary environmental protections, 
developers would have to take responsibility for cleanup and remedy where farmer/growers 
were unable or unwilling to do so. 
 110. The term “sliding scale” seems to connote that wealthy countries can pay more for 
their products, and should therefore receive greater protection. While this unpleasant 
proposition may technically be true, where the real additional benefit associated with the costly 
protections is small, the marginal detriment to a country without such protections is also small. 
See also Siegrist, supra note 90. Michael Siegrist’s data, which suggest that poorer countries 
are less averse to bioengineered food, are limited in scope to European countries. Id. at 32. If 
such a trend were broadly applicable, one might expect that underdeveloped countries (and not 
just less wealthy European countries) would be willing markets for bioengineered foods. Id. at 
33. Given these countries’ lesser ability to pay for the technology, developers might be willing 
to provide it at a reduced cost.  
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generally pay lower prices while producers would benefit from 
greater sales. This viewpoint, however, requires that all industry 
participants maintain strict self-controls, and thus remains susceptible 
to the “one bad apple” problem.111 Further, it provides no 
governmental protection to developers against their liability to 
unsatisfied customers.112 The benefits of industrial autonomy come at 
a cost of health, safety, and environmental risk for the general public. 
Under the industrial autonomy approach, less regulation is better 
regulation with respect to the competitive market. Under this 
analysis, the proposed regulation would be an unnecessary barrier to 
free trade. Advocates of industrial autonomy would be dissatisfied 
with any rule that purported to regulate either biotechnology or food 
products in general.  
 
 111. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. The industrial autonomy model does not 
provide a reasonable or workable philosophy for the domestic regulation of biotechnology. 
Only in combination with centralized government regulation can the industrial autonomy model 
increase efficiency without detriment to the safety of citizens or to protection of the 
environment. In practice, the model would require product compliance only at the location of 
consumption or sale, not at the location of development. Where centralized government 
regulation is not available, as in underdeveloped countries, the industry would have to take 
responsibility to provide safe, environmentally sound products. From this, however, originates 
the risk of “one bad apple” spoiling the lot. Id. While the risk might be unattractive to a country 
able to acquire a wide variety of goods, for a developing country the additional risk involved 
may be small as compared to the benefit of receiving bioengineered products at a low cost. 
 112. See Deacon & Paterson, supra note 69. According to Deacon and Paterson’s 
assessment of tort liability with regard to statutory compliance, developers of bioengineered 
food cannot, as a rule, assume that FDA approval certifies a tort-resistant standard of due care. 
Id. at 598. One product of the proposed regulation, however, is a letter of compliance from the 
FDA, which states that the developer has met the applicable standard of care. Premarket Notice 
Concerning Bioengineered Foods, 66 Fed. Reg. at 4713. See also supra note 32 and 
accompanying text. Given a trial court’s discretion to require a higher standard than demanded 
by the FDA, there could be a possibility of a divergent standard of care.  
 Without centralized government regulation, there would not be a divergent standard of care 
for bioengineered products between common law and statutory obligations. Common law 
obligations would be the only relevant standard, and as a result, developers would have 
virtually unchecked liability to disgruntled consumers. A possible consequence of such liability 
could be massive tort damage awards. In turn, these could lead to the industry’s collapse. 
Alternatively, developers might choose to pass the costs of the tort awards to their consumers. 
A worst-case scenario would be that without centralized regulation, one or more developers 
might fail to act responsibly, causing significant damage to the population or to the 
environment. Without a grant of executive authority to act against the developers, however, 
individuals would have to carry the burden, perhaps through nuisance suits. See generally 
Redick & Bernstein, supra note 76. 
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IV. PROPOSAL 
The FDA should adopt the proposed regulation to promote a 
policy of cooperative product stewardship. Cooperative product 
stewardship between the government and developers of 
bioengineered foods will provide domestic and international 
consumers of American products with the greatest variety of safe, 
environmentally sound products. The proposed regulation, as 
currently written, will neither cause serious harm nor provide a great 
benefit to major food developers. Because all current major 
developers of bioengineered products have participated in the 
voluntary process, the rule as enacted would add only the costs of 
preparing the public disclosure documents. As estimated by the FDA, 
these costs are relatively small when compared to the revenue of 
major developers.  
While the proposed regulation will generally promote the 
development of bioengineered foods, as drafted, it may still present 
serious obstacles to small developers. A key area for improvement is 
the application process for small developers. The principal 
modification in the rule, as written, is that small developers should be 
allowed to conduct some consultation sessions over the telephone 
instead of in person.113 While this modification may be a valuable 
governmental concession, one possible improvement might include 
some form of government subsidy to defray the cost of the process, 
pending a preliminary showing of an approvable product. 
Alternatively, the government could pare down the required filings 
and collect or maintain additional information at its own expense. 
Financial or administrative assistance would provide small 
developers with more opportunities to bring new products to market 
and compete with large developers for the benefit of consumers.  
The proposed regulation, if passed, will not have a significant 
effect on the competitiveness of bioengineered foods imported to the 
United States. While the rule may increase production costs 
domestically due to its extensive disclosure requirements, 
international developers will have to submit to the same process. 
 
 113. Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-602 (2000). See also supra note 44 and 
accompanying text. 
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Therefore, the proposed regulations will not give international 
developers any price advantage over their domestic counterparts. 
More importantly, consumers will be assured of the same level of 
safety with international products as they can with domestic 
products.114  
With regard to the export of American bioengineered foods, the 
proposed regulation may provide additional assurance of product 
safety in some international markets. It will not placate advocates of 
the Precautionary Principle, nor will it satisfy those whose primary 
concerns involve labeling of bioengineered products. On the other 
hand, the safety standards that developers must meet for certification 
will provide a benefit to export destinations where there are no such 
requirements. Adherence to these standards and certification 
procedures, however, may make United States products more 
expensive and therefore less competitive in these markets. Where the 
United States may wish to trade with an underdeveloped or 
impoverished nation, some reduction of the statutory requirements 
might allow the sale of bioengineered products that still meet 
minimum safety standards. 
As part of a cooperative product stewardship model, the United 
States might consider adopting some elements of an industrial 
autonomy model, especially with regard to international trade. A 
workable modification of the industrial autonomy model might 
consist of certain minimum standards for the development and 
production of bioengineered foods, whereby developers would 
choose the final standards to meet for a given product, depending on 
where they wished to market it. Premarket notification itself might 
not differ significantly for products that are intended for domestic 
consumption. Yet, developers might choose to follow different or 
additional requirements for the labeling or post-sale restrictions on 
using such products. 
The United States government should not adopt the Precautionary 
Principle as the model for biotechnology regulation. While a 
Precautionary Principle model might make United States products 
more attractive for sale in the European Union in the short term, it 
 
 
 114. Premarket Notice Concerning Bioengineered Foods, 66 Fed. Reg. at 4712. See also 
supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
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would likely result in prohibitively higher prices domestically and 
thus dampen efforts to develop new products. As government 
agencies and developers of bioengineered foods cooperate to develop 
new products, the more conservatively regulated nations will realize 
that they are at a trade disadvantage. 
V. CONCLUSION 
No matter how much attention one pays to the back-stage details 
of bringing bioengineered foods to market, developers and producers’ 
money and efforts are wasted if consumers lack confidence in the 
product. Many Europeans have decided to reject biotechnology and 
to forego its associated benefits. In general, Americans are not up in 
arms over bioengineered foods, but the average consumer is probably 
not fully aware of the bioengineered products that he or she 
encounters on a daily basis. What seems like academic debate over 
regulatory procedures today may tomorrow become a matter of 
general social concern, should Congress pass legislation mandating 
the labeling of bioengineered foods. The FDA and developers of all 
types of biotechnology should begin to educate the public about the 
benefits and risks of biotechnology before extremists have a chance 
to convince them to fear it. 
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